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Advertising Policies of Medical
Journals: Conflicts of Interest
for Journal Editors and
Professional Societies
David Orentlicher, Michael K. Hehir II

Aof

s the medical profession becomes more and more
a commercial enterprise, commentators are subjecting conflicts of interest in medicine to increasing scrutiny. However, one critical area of conflict has largely
escaped discussion-the conflicts of interest raised by the
advertising policies of medical journals. Moreover, when
these conflicts are discussed, they are examined almost exclusively in terms of the concerns that they pose for journal
editors. Yet, there is a second critical concern with journal
advertising policies. The policies also create serious conflicts of interest for the professional societies that own medical journals.'
In this article, we will discuss the conflicts of interest
that are raised for journal editors and professional societies
by journal advertising policies, and we will conclude that
the policies are exactly backward. Currently, medical journals rely on advertisements from pharmaceutical companies and other health-related businesses and avoid-indeed
exclude-advertisements from consumer-oriented companies, like producers of automobiles, golf equipment, or jewelry. We submit that the medical journals, the medical profession, and the public would be better served if consumeroriented advertisement were preferred over health-related
advertising.
Some of our arguments may seem harsh or unfair to
journal editors; the arguments may also suggest an unduly
skeptical view of the editorial process. In fact, we recognize
that journal editors approach their responsibilities with great
care and concern. We also recognize that journal editors go
to great lengths to ensure the integrity of their publications
and that journal quality reflects those efforts. 2 Unfortunately,
even the most properly motivated efforts can be compro-
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mised by conflicts of interest. The problem with conflicts
of interest is that they operate insidiously.' As a result, it is
often necessary to guard against harm by reducing or eliminating a conflict rather than by simply exercising great diligence against its influence.

Current advertising policies
It is common practice for medical journals to run advertising only from companies in the health care industry. The
"Index to Advertisers" for the June 16, 1999 issue of the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), for
example, lists twenty-four manufacturers of prescription
or over-the-counter drugs, one medical device manufacturer, and one medical publisher. 4 This is not very surprising. One would expect drug companies and other purveyors of health care products and services to be particularly
interested in reaching an audience of physicians. Moreover,
advertisers like to target their advertisements as closely as
possible to their intended audience and to avoid spending
money on readers who are not likely to purchase their goods.
The common practice, however, is not simply the result of a "natural" evolution of the journal advertising marketplace. It is also the result of a common policy of medical
journals to categorically refuse advertising space to companies that are not in a health care-related business. We contacted six major professional journals, and none of them
runs nonhealth care advertisements. Three of the journalsAnnals of Internal Medicine, the New EnglandJournal of
Medicine and Pediatrics-explicitlyexclude nonhealth care
advertisements as part of their formal advertising policies.
For example, according to the "General Information" page
in each issue of Pediatrics,"All commercial advertising appearing in PEDIATRICS must relate to the practice of medicine and be approved by the [American] Academy [of Pedi-

Volume 27:2, Summer 1999
atrics]." 5 Two journals-the Journal of the American College of Surgeons and Obstetrics & Gynecology-do not have
formal policies with regard to nonhealth care advertisements. However, as an informal policy, they seek advertisements only from health care companies. Finally, one journal that we contacted-JAMA-formally permits advertisements from nonhealth-related companies. JAMA's policy
allows consumerproducts or services to be advertised, provided that (1) the inclusion of the advertisement does not
interfere with the purposes of the journal, and (2) the advertisement is not for an alcoholic beverage or tobacco product. Limitations are also placed on advertising of dietary
programs and nutritional supplements. In the September 3
and November 12, 1997 issues of JAMA, Land Rover ran
advertisements for its Range Rover luxury sports utility
vehicles, 6 and other issues included advertisements for
Wellcraft powerboats and Steinway & Sons pianos. 7 However, since then, JAMA has decided that, for the foreseeable
future, it will reserve its advertising space for health-related
companies only.8
Ethical concerns from health industry advertising
Health-related advertising raises several ethical concerns, both
for journal editors and for professional medical societies.
Journaleditors
Health care advertisements are problematic for journal editors in several ways. First, the acceptance of advertising may
result in a compromise of the quality of the editorial process. Perhaps the clearest example of the editorial influence
of advertising occurs with respect to special symposium issues of medical journals that are funded by pharmaceutical
companies. Researchers identified 625 symposium issues
in 58 leading medical journals from 1966-1989. For the
42 percent of the 625 symposia that were funded by a single
drug company (262 symposia), the journal was less likely
to adhere to its usual peer-review process.9 Another group
of researchers looked at articles published in journal supplements, a category that overlaps considerably with the category of symposium issues. The researchers found that the
supplement articles were of lower quality than articles published in the parent journal. 10
Health care advertising may also influence the editorial process in more subtle ways. Even when there is a separation between the editorial and business offices, journal
editors are aware of the companies that purchase advertisements. At.some leading journals, the editor-in-chief reviews
all advertisements after their first publication to ensure that
the advertisements comply with the journal's advertising
policy. Journal editors may feel a sense of gratitude to the
companies for their financial support. 1 Indeed, one major
journal thanked its long-time advertisers by name on its

editorial pages. 12 Gratitude would encourage positive feelings toward the companies, and those feelings could subconsciously influence editorial judgment. For example, if a
clinical study suggested that drug treatment was not as good
as surgical therapy for a subclass of patients with coronary
artery disease, and a journal received the bulk of its advertising revenues from pharmaceutical companies, journal
editors may be more likely to reject a report of the study
because of concerns that the study design was not rigorous
enough.

3

Medical journals publish policy-oriented articles, and
editorial review of those articles could also be affected. If a
journal receives considerable revenues from industry advertising, the editors may be more receptive to articles that
criticize the advertising and marketing regulations of the
Food and Drug Administration. The editors also may be
less willing to publish commentaries that call for a reevaluation of decisions by the federal government to expedite
the drug-approval process.
To be sure, we are not suggesting that journal editors
would justify their decision to accept or reject a manuscript
in terms of their gratitude for advertising dollars or even
that they would be aware of the connection. Rather, it stands
to reason that "objective" judgments by journal editors
would be influenced subconsciously by their subjective feelings. Journal editors are no less susceptible to such influences than other people. And, we know that employers
making hiring decisions and landlords making rental decisions give preference to the applicants about whom they
feel more positively because the applicants are thinner or
viewed as more physically attractive in other ways. 14 More
to the point, we know that financial incentives subconsciously affect physicians' judgments when they make individual treatment decisions. When a walk-in clinic changed
its compensation structure from a flat hourly wage to include bonuses that were tied to the income generated for
the clinic by diagnostic tests, the clinic's physicians started
ordering more laboratory tests and x-ray studies.'"
To an important extent, it is not in the interest of companies if their advertising compromises the editorial process. If readers perceive a decline in journal quality, they
may cancel their subscriptions, and the companies will no
longer be able to reach their desired audience. Some journals have apparently been hurt by perceptions that they let
advertising influence their editorial process. These considerations suggest that journal editors would better express
their gratitude to their advertisers by avoiding any changes
in their procedures. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on the
self-interest of companies to protect against harm from
advertising. Companies themselves have conflicting interests. They want to advertise in high quality journals, but
they also want to sell their products. In the end, if a company has the second-best drug in a class, it will not see itself
as better off if medical journals make it abundantly clear
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that its drug is only second best. Moreover, companies often face conflicts between long- and short-term goals. A
compromised editorial process has long-term deleterious
effects for advertisers, but it may yield benefits in the short
term. Companies may seize the short-term gain, either because of investor pressures or because of the general tendency of people to discount long-term risks.
A second important concern with health-related advertising lies in the appearance of impropriety. It may be
that medical journals erect effective "walls" between their
editorial and business offices and that editors consider only
scholarly merit when deciding which articles to publish.6
However, when journals generate millions of dollars in advertising revenues, it is very difficult for physicians and the
public to believe that these revenues have no effect on the
editorial process. Indeed, questions about collusion between
the editorial and business offices at JAMA arose in 1997,
when the journal published the results of a research trial
reporting the equivalence of generic and brand-name versions of synthetic thyroid hormone (used to treat patients
with hypothyroidism).1 7 In the issue with the results, two
full-page advertisements appeared for a generic version of
the hormone from a company that ordinarily did not advertise the product inJAMA. 8 AlthoughJAMA editors could
not explain how the generic manufacturer knew about the
research article, 9 the company stated that it had advance
knowledge and used it to place its advertisements.20
The appearance of impropriety can also be used to attack the credibility of articles that appear in medical journals. When the New EnglandJournalofMedicine published
articles, 2' letters, 22 and an editorial 23 critical of alternative

medicines in its September 17, 1998 issue, a representative
of the company that produced one of the criticized medications24 argued on National Public Radio that the Journal
was biased against alternative medicines because of its relationship with the pharmaceutical industry.2s It may be that
the editorial decisions for that issue (or other issues) were
not influenced at all by the Journal'sreceipt of pharmaceutical advertising dollars. Nevertheless, the possibility of such
influence can be used to undermine the credibility of the
Journal,as well as that of other journals.
Any erosion of trust in the editorial process is troublesome. Medical journals play a critical role in disseminating
the results of medical research. Readers rely on the journals
to identify the important studies and to ensure that the studies actually demonstrate what they purport to demonstrate.
If physicians discount a study because it might be tainted by
the journal's conflict of interest, the care of many patients
could suffer.
Third, and most important, even if there is no influence on the editorial process and no erosion of trust, editors compromise the scientific quality of their journals by
accepting health-related advertising. Although advertising
may provide some educational value, 6 advertisements of-

ten leave physicians with a skewed view of a product's benefits and risks. In one study, researchers identified two categories of drugs (cerebral vasodilators and propoxyphene
compounds) for which commercial sources of information
made claims of efficacy that were substantially at odds with
what could be justified by the scientific literature. 27 Physicians surveyed in the study reported that they relied on the
scientific literature and gave little weight to commercial
sources of information. Yet, for substantial percentages of
the physicians, actual beliefs and subscribing practices were
consistent with the commercial claims of efficacy. In another study, experts reviewed 109 full-page pharmaceutical advertisements in ten leading medical journals. 2 The
experts concluded that 62 percent of the advertisements
should have been rejected or required to undergo major
revision. They also believed that 44 percent of the advertisements would lead to improper prescribing if a physician
had only the information presented in the advertisement
about the drug. Health-related advertising, in short, may
diminish the scientific integrity of a journal because the
journal's audience reads and absorbs information from the
advertising as well as the scientific articles.29 This is of particular concern because many physicians (69 percent in one
study) identify medical journals as their most important
source of medical information.30
Professionalsocieties
Although the conflicts of interest for journal editors are
readily recognized, the conflicts of interest for professional
societies are generally overlooked. Yet, these conflicts are
also of great concern.
Many of the leading medical journals are published by
professional societies. The American Academy of Pediatrics publishes Pediatrics,the American College of Physicians
(ACP) publishes Annals of InternalMedicine, the American
Medical Association (AMA) publishesJAMA, and the Massachusetts Medical Society (MMS) publishes the New EnglandJournal of Medicine. Similarly, the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists publishes Obstetrics&
Gynecology, and the American College of Surgeons publishes the Journal of the American College of Surgeons. If
advertising revenues help to ensure a profit for a journal,
then the proceeds improve the bottom line of its parent
medical society.
Because professional societies disseminate information
about health care products, it is problematic that they benefit from advertisements for those products. The AMA received millions of dollars from pharmaceutical company
advertisements at the same time that it was publishing its
annual Drug Evaluations book (whose publication ceased
in 1995). It is not clear that the AMA could be sufficiently
objective in evaluating drugs when its budget was heavily
subsidized by the pharmaceutical industry."'

Volume 27:2, Summer 1999

When professional societies contribute to the public
debate on health care issues, they also face important conflicts of interest with respect to their receipt of advertising
dollars. On one hand, the societies have a duty to advocate
on behalf of patient welfare. On the other hand, certain
policy positions may affect the societies' revenues from
health care companies. If a particular position would be
good for patients but bad for pharmaceutical companies,
device companies, or other health care businesses, a professional society would help patients at the risk of hurting its
own financial well-being. Members of the affected industry
could limit their advertising expenditures either to retaliate
against the society or because the change in public policy
led to a decline in the companies' profits and therefore their
advertising budgets.
This conflict is especially serious because professional
societies play a critical role in the shaping of health care
policy in the United States. When the President, Congress,
state legislatures, or courts decide matters of health care
regulation or law, they rely substantially on the perspectives of the medical profession as represented by their professional organizations. 3 2 This is so not only because physicians can explain how a change in policy or law will affect
the health care system, but also because lawmakers lack the
medical expertise that would make them confident about
their own perspectives.
As with the conflicts faced by journal editors, appearances of impropriety are also important here. Even if a professional society's positions are not in fact influenced by
their receipt of advertising revenues, people will wonder
whether the professional society was so influenced. If the
AMA opposes price controls on prescription drugs, for example, the public will be unsure whether the opposition is
truly rooted in legitimate concerns, like the potentially harmful effects on research spending by industry, or whether the
opposition reflects the AMAs defense of its own pecuniary
interests. Similarly, if other readers of both the AM.s Drug
Evaluations and the independent Medical Letter found, as
one of us did, that the authors of The Medical Letter gave
more definitive prescribing recommendations and were
more likely to conclude that there was nothing to be gained
by prescribing some drugs instead of their alternatives, a
the readers might have wondered whether the AMA.s analyses were subconsciously affected by the Association's interest in maintaining good relations with all of the companies
in the pharmaceutical industry.
Countervailing benefits of health industry
advertising
Given the potential harms from health care advertising in
medical journals, the editors should refuse health care advertisements unless there are countervailing benefits that
outweigh the risks. We will now discuss the benefits and

consider whether they are sufficient to justify health care
advertising in medical journals. In doing so, it is useful to
consider whether journals should be able to rely only on
the health care industry for their advertising or whether
journals should be able to rely on the health care industry
together with other industries for advertising.
Exclusive reliance on health care advertising
As mentioned, it is common for medical journals to accept
advertisements only when they feature a health-related product or service.34 We find it hard to see how this policy can
be justified. If advertisements are accepted from airlines (for
example, Delta), credit card companies (for example, American Express), golf equipment suppliers (for example, Callaway), jewelers (for example, Tiffany's), or automobile manufacturers (for example, Cadillac), journals would have a

larger pool of companies to which they could sell advertising space, and they would reduce the conflict of interest
that arises from the practice of only accepting health care
advertisements. This suggests that health care companies

are not the first place medical journals should look for advertising. Rather, they are the last place medical journals
should look.
To be sure, medical journals and their parent professional societies would owe the same sense of gratitude to
these other companies, but it is hard to see how their relationships with the companies Would come into conflict with
their duties to scientific integrity and patient welfare. IfJAMA
accepted advertisements from the Callaway Golf Company

for its Big Bertha golf driver, JAMA editors might add the
club to their golf bags, and the AMA might oppose efforts
by the Professional Golfers' Association to regulate golf club
size;"5 but these activities would not affect the quality of
JAMA or of health care delivery in this country. Similarly, if
the Annals of InternalMedicine ran advertisements for Delta
and USAirways, the editors at Annals might start flying those
airlines more often, and the ACP might oppose govern-

ment regulations that would help start-up airlines, but these
activities also would not compromise journal quality or
health care delivery.
Some journal editors explain a policy of accepting only
health-related advertising as a way to foster the mission of
their journals. In this view, health-related advertisements
are included because they have educational value that augments the information provided by the journal's articles.
Nonhealth-related advertisements, on the other hand, would
not contribute to the journal's educational mission. 6 This
argument is not persuasive. The mission of medical journals is to provide the most reliable educational information
available. However, as discussed above, advertisements compromise the educational value of medical journals. Advertisers see education as one of their goals, but it is secondary

to the primary aim of using advertisements to increase sales.
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Typically, a company can maximize its profits by providing
imperfect rather than perfect information to potential consumers. To put it another way, medical schools would not
give classroom time to pharmaceutical company sales representatives as a way to enhance their educational mission.
The U.S. Supreme Court also has rejected the argument that health-related advertising fosters the educational
mission of medical journals.3 7 The issue has come up because advertising revenues would constitute tax-exempt
income if the advertising "contributes importantly" to the
educational purposes of a journal's tax-exempt, parent professional society. When the ACP asked for a refund of taxes
paid on advertising revenues from the Annals of Internal
Medicine, the Supreme Court concluded that, although
advertising might in theory contribute importantly to a
journal's educational mission, it did not in fact do so in the
case of Annals. The Court observed that the journal's advertising decisions turned on whether companies were willing to pay for the space (rather than on the goal of providing a systematic presentation of the goods or services being
advertised) and that the repeated advertising of established
drugs undermined the claim that the advertisements were
3
principally designed to alert readers to new developments.
Another possible justification for the exclusion of nonhealth advertising lies in aesthetic considerations. It may
seem in poor taste to run advertisements for cars, credit
cards, or jewelry in a professional journal. However, aesthetic tastes are not a sufficient reason to embrace a significant conflict of interest. Tackiness is a small price to pay for
greater scientific integrity and higher quality health care.
Of course, when advertising goes beyond tackiness to include
deception or fraud or otherwise to promote unethical practices, the advertising should be rejected. But mere bad taste
is less troubling than a financial conflict of interest.
It seems fairly clear, then, that medical journals should
eliminate their requirement that advertisements come only
from companies with a health-related product or service.
The harder question is whether journals should sell some
of their advertisement space for health-related products or
39
services.

Reliance on both health-relatedand other kinds of
advertisements
We could conclude that medical journals should sell advertising space only to nonhealth-related companies. Such a
practice would avoid the conflicts of interest from healthrelated advertising. Moreover, many consumer-oriented
companies, especially sellers of luxury items, ought to be
interested in advertising to a readership with the average
household income of physicians.
However, it may be the case that excluding health-related advertisements would have negative consequences for
medical research and education. Journals could see a de-

crease in their advertising revenues if they excluded healthrelated advertising. Any advertiser can reach physicians
when they advertise to the public at large through magazines like Business Week or Time, but health-related companies probably have a stronger interest than nonhealth
care companies in targeting physicians specifically with their
advertisements. 40 Indeed, an almost exclusive reliance on
pharmaceutical advertisements exists even with Diversions,
a magazine for physicians with articles about leisure activities and therefore a seemingly natural place for airlines,
hotels, and speedboat manufacturers to advertise. Journals
that have tried to interest nonhealth care companies in advertising have apparently found it difficult to do so. Moreover, health-related companies may especially perceive an
advantage in having their advertisements appear in leading
medical journals. Association with the journals may result
in some of the journals' prestige rubbing off on the companies. Given the benefits of advertising in medical journals,
health-related companies are probably willing to pay higher
rates than are other kinds of companies for medical journal
advertising. If excluding health-related advertisements reduces the revenue of medical journals, the journals might
have to curtail the number of issues or the number of pages
per issue. Fewer articles would be published, and medical
research and education could suffer.
A key question, then, is whether the financial benefits
for medicine from health-related advertising are sufficient
to outweigh the harms from the advertising. 4' This is an
empirical question that is difficult to answer. On one hand,
a loss of journal pages would compromise the ability of
researchers to publish important information. On the other
hand, currently a very large number of medical journals are
being published; hence one could argue that fewer journals
would ensure that only studies of high quality are published.4 2 In the face of this uncertainty, it may make the
most sense for journals to reject health-related advertising
unless they find that, by doing so, they meaningfully compromise their educational mission.
In this regard, it is relevant that many leading journals
in other professional fields do not rely as heavily on advertisements that raise the kinds of concerns posed by advertisements in medical journals. The HarvardLaw Review,
for example, contains only a few pages of advertisements
in each issue, mostly from academic presses. Journals like
the American Political Science Review and the American
SociologicalReview contain a good deal of advertising from
academic presses, but the connection between editorial decisions and the interests of academic presses seems much
more tenuous than the connection between editorial decisions at medical journals and the interests of pharmaceutical companies. The advertisements do create a conflict of
interest for the journal editors to the extent that the journals publish book reviews, but the conflict would not extend much beyond that particular area.43
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Although there is some uncertainty about the propriety of health-related advertisements for medical journals,
we can say with confidence that a number of the journals
would not suffer if they dropped health-related advertising. For example, the New EnglandJournal of Medicine
covers its costs of publication between subscription fees and
classified advertisement charges; it uses the revenues from
health company advertisements to subsidize the programs
44
of the MMS.
When advertising revenues are used to fund the programs of the parent professional societies, as they are for
many journals, 4 the argument for accepting health-related
advertising is weak. The case for health-related advertising
depends on the view that an important public benefit derives from subsidies for the activities of medical professional
societies. It does not seem very persuasive to justify healthrelated advertising as a way to ensure funding for professional society activities. Professional societies primarily serve
the interests of their members. For example, on key public
policy questions, the AMAs positions often put the needs
of physicians before those of patients.4 Paul Starr has described the AMA's opposition to the development of health
maintenance organizations and the enactment of the Medicare program. 47 More recently, the AMA helped defeat President Clinton's efforts to ensure universal health care coverage, 48 and the AM.s own investigators criticized it for failing to protect patient welfare and the integrity of the patient-physician relationship when it endorsed a legislative
ban on partial birth abortions. 49 The AMA's canceled endorsement of Sunbeam home health care products was an
especially troubling example of self-serving behavior.5 0 Given
the orientation of professional societies to the needs of their
members, the members should support the societies' activities with their dues and other contributions.
Professional societies often undertake public-spirited
programs, like the AMA.s SmokeLess States Tobacco Use
Prevention Program. However, such programs typically
consume a relatively small percentage of a society's general
operating budget. Often, the programs rely almost entirely
on grants from foundations or the federal government, with
the professional society providing office space and staff support.5' Accordingly, even though some of a journal's advertising revenues help subsidize the programs, the bulk of the
revenues goes to the society's other activities. That kind of
imbalance prevents us from justifying the conflicts of interest from health-related advertising in terms of the public
good from professional society programs. In other words,
while professional societies can, and often do, act in the
public interest, revenues from their journals probably do
not play an important role in their ability to do so.
Conclusions
Conflicts of interest cannot be eliminated entirely in medi-

cine, nor would we want to eliminate all of them. For example, pharmaceutical company researchers often will have
valuable insights to share with their academic colleagues.
Hence, we would not want their conflicts of interest to
preclude their participation in professional conferences.
Nevertheless, it is important to eliminate unnecessary
conflicts of interest. Health-related advertising in medical
journals raises serious conflicts of interest for journal editors and professional societies. At the very least, medical
journals should amend their advertising policies to permit
advertisements from nonhealth-related companies. Indeed,
the journals should look first to nonhealth-related companies for advertising revenues. A strong case can also be made
for the position that journals should accept advertisements
only from nonhealth-related companies. In particular, for
those journals that can cover their costs of publication without health-related advertising, the case for health-related
advertisements is very hard to sustain.
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